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A study on change and determinants of South Koreans’ perceptions on Unification 
Executive Summary 
South Koreans’ interest in and aspirations for unification have decreased recently. This 
decrease of desires for unification is one of the obstacles to achieve unification. This study 
analyzes the change of South Koreans’ perceptions of unification and examines various 
factors that affect those perceptions toward unification. I use unification perceptions survey 
data from 2007 to 2014 collected by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies Seoul 
National University. 
The dependent variables of this study are perceptions of the necessity of unification and 
the possibility of unification. Independent variables are classified into four types. They are 
expected benefit factors, the political factor, national identity factors and demographic factors. 
Expected benefit factors are perceptions of the economic consequences of unification for 
South Korea and for the individual. The political factor is ideology. The national identity 
factors are perception of North Korea and friendship with North Koreans. The demographic 
factors are sex, education, income and age. 
I use multiple regressions to test the effect of independent variables. Perception of 
national benefit and personal benefit, ideology, perception of North Korea, friendship with 
North Koreans, sex, age, and education have a significant effect on the dependent variables. 
 The results of this study show that a large number of people are pessimistic about the 
necessity and possibility of unification. Also, the perception of unification is different 
according to perception of benefit, ideology, national identity and demographic factors such 
as sex, age, and education. To gain the support of the public for unification, the South Korean 
government will need to address the factors identified in this study. 
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Introduction 
The division of Korea began in 1948. South and North Korea have suffered a national 
tragedy of systemic rivalry, slander, and even war. At the beginning of the division, the 
unification of North and South Korea was recognized as a critical national task. South 
Koreans sang a song called ‘Our wish is unification’ and taught the next generation to have a 
desire for unification. Therefore, the perception that unification is a necessary task was very 
strong. However, as the division of South and North Korea has continued for a long time, 
South Koreans’ perceptions of unification have changed. According to Chosun Ilbo(2014), 
more and more people have come to think that unification is unnecessary or that the 
possibility of unification is low. Chosun Ilbo reports a survey that showed that only about 50% 
of the South Koreans perceive that unification is necessary. There is also a big difference 
between generations in terms of the perception of the necessity of unification and the 
perception of the possibility of unification. The younger generation had less desire for 
unification than the older generation and the attitude of the younger generation toward the 
possibility of unification was negative. (Chosun ilbo 2014). In addition, women showed less 
desire for unification than men. Also, conservative people had less desire for unification than 
progressive people, and had a negative attitude toward the possibility of unification.  
South Koreans’ perceptions on unification are a very important factor in achieving 
unification because they will be the subjects of unification. It is difficult to achieve 
unification without South and North Koreans’ desire to have a unified Korea. If South 
Koreans have a hostile attitude about North Korea, it is difficult to accomplish peaceful 
unification. Unification that is accomplished without agreement upon a vision of a future 
unified Korea could trigger much confusion. If people think that unification is not necessary 
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or impossible, it will be very difficult to achieve unification. In addition, it is difficult for the 
government to pursue a policy contrary to the public's perceptions in a democratic society. 
Therefore, South Korean’s perceptions of unification are very important factors for the 
achievement of unification.  
To make successful unification policies, it is necessary to analyze how the Korean people 
perceive unification. It will also be necessary to analyze and confirm why the perceptions of 
the people have changed and which factors influence perceptions toward unification. The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the change of people’s perceptions of unification and 
identify what factors influence South Koreans’ perceptions of unification. 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
Many researchers have studied people’s perceptions of unification. I will briefly introduce 
the existing research trends on perceptions of unification. 
Definition of unification, perceptions on unification. 
The meaning of unification in South and North Korea can be defined as the process of 
eliminating the mutual distrust caused by the division of history and creating a new ethnic 
community where the residents of the South and the North can coexist. (Sim et al 2013) , 
Perceptions of unification can be defined as thoughts or values about division and nationality, 
differences between the two Koreas, cultural heterogeneity, the justification and process of 
unification, and challenges after unification. This definition includes the ability to judge the 
value of unification, the things that can appear in the process and the attitude expressed 
throughout. (Sim et al 2013) 
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Trends of social surveys on unification perceptions. 
Surveyors have surveyed students and adults about perceptions of unification with North 
Korea since the 1980’s. While several surveys use similar questions and scales, comparison 
across all surveys is difficult because they do not use identical questions and scales. 
Fortunately, several surveys on unification and North Korea after 2000 implement repeat 
questions and scales to make it possible to trace changes in perceptions over time. (Eun Gi 
Soo(2010). 
Studies on the Change of perceptions on unification. 
Kim, Hyun Oak (2001) studied the components and inner conflict structure of perceptions 
of unification. This study shows that people’s perceptions of unification were weakened, 
especially among the younger generation. In Hee Hamn and Han Jeong Ja (2000) explored 
differences in unification perceptions, focusing on people who were born in the 1960’s, the 
youth, and women. This study shows that interest in and aspiration for unification among the 
young generation and females were lower than those among the old generation and males. 
Interest and aspiration for unification is highest among people born in the 1960’s. Also, this 
group regards North Korea as a cooperative partner. (In Hee hamn and Han Jeong Ja 2000). A 
number of studies analyzing the unification perceptions of adolescents and university 
students have been conducted. (Byeon Jong-Heon 2012; Kwon Young-Seung & Lee Soo-
Jung 2011). These studies reveal a gap in the attitudes toward unification between the young 
and the older generations. In other words, those in their 20s in South Korean society are 
generally low in interest in and understanding of North Korea, and gradually become 
indifferent to the unification of North and South Korea. These studies also show that the 
tendency to approach the issue of unification from a social, rational perspective rather than an 
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emotional perspective is increasing.  
The characteristics of South Korean’s unification perceptions in previous research can be 
comprehensively summarized as follows. First, the extent to which unification is perceived to 
be necessary has weakened. ( Kim, Hyun Oak(2001), In Hee hamn and Han Jeong Ja(2000), 
Byeon Jong-Heon 2012; Kwon Young-Seung and Lee Soo-Jung 2011). South Koreans think 
that unification should be pursued carefully rather than as a matter of fact. This suggests that 
people’s aspirations for unification have weakened or that South Koreans have started to 
think about unification from a cost-benefit perspective rather than as a matter of course. 
(Byeon Jong-Heon 2012). Second, ethnic and emotional aspects of unification are still 
effective. One of the most representative reasons for unification is that South and North 
Koreans are one people. (Lee, Nae- Young (2014). Reasons for denying the necessity of 
unification are various: first is antagonism toward and distrust of North Korea; second is 
distrust of the fact that unification will create economic benefits and strong military power; 
third is resistance to enormous economic and non-economic costs, which will be involved in 
the unification process. (In Hee hamn and Han Jeong Ja(2000), Lee, Nae- Young (2014) 
Studies on the determinants of perceptions on unification. 
   Lee Sung - Woo (2013) found that political factors had a greater effect on the perception 
of unification than economic factors and social expectation factors. Lee, Nae- Young (2014) 
suggested that age, sex, ideology, solidarity with North Korea, and expected benefits affect 
the perceptions of unification. Jang Min-Soo and Kim Jun Suck(2015) argue that attitudes 
toward North Korean people, political interest, ideology, education level, sex, generation, and 
region influence the perceptions of unification. Lee, Nae-Yong (2014) categorizes these 
factors in four ways. Factors affecting perceptions of unification are categorized into socio-
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demographic factors, political factors, national identity factors and expected benefit factors. 
Back Dae-Hyun and Lee Jae-Wan (2015) suggested that factors of unification cost and 
benefits affected unification perceptions and attitudes. 
 The factors found to affect perceptions toward unification can be comprehensively 
summarized as follows. First are demographic factors. Age, sex, education, and region affect 
perceptions of unification. Older people, men, and educated people showed a positive 
perceptions toward the necessity and possibility of unification, as opposed to the younger 
generation, females and uneducated people, who showed a negative attitude.( In Hee hamn 
and Han Jeong Ja(2000), Byeon Jong-Heon 2012; Kwon Young-Seung and Lee Soo-Jung 
2011) Second are political factors. Ideology and political interest affect perceptions of 
unification. Progressive people have stronger aspiration and interest in unification than 
conservative people. (Lee, Nae-Yong (2014), Jang Min-Soo and Kim Jun Suck(2015). Third 
are national identity factors. Perceptions of North Korea and North Koreans affect 
perceptions of unification. The desire and interest in unification of those who consider North 
Korea as the same people and same ethnicity is stronger than the desire and interest of those 
who do not consider them the same people and same ethnicity. (Lee, Nae-Yong (2014). 
Fourth are economic factors. Perceptions on economic preparation, economic benefit and 
economic cost affect the perceptions of unification. (Back Dae-Hyun amd Lee Jae-Wan). 
Finally, expected benefits affect the perceptions of unification. Those who have a high 
expectation of benefits resulting from unification have stronger interest in and aspiration for 
unification. (Lee, Nae-Yong (2014) 
Research Design 
Research design 
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South Koreans’ interest and aspirations for unification have decreased recently. The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the tendency of people’s perceptions of the unification 
and identify what factors influence these perceptions. Trends of unification perceptions will 
be measured by two components: the perception of the necessity of unification and the 
perception of the possibility of unification. In addition to this task, this paper will identify 
what factors influence these two components using multiple regressions. Most of the previous 
research just portrays differences in perception of unification according to demographic 
factors, or only considers demographic factors that influence perception of unification using   
data from short period, which is less than 3 years. It is very rare to analyze trends of 
unification perceptions through empirical data which is collected over 3 years and to analyze 
various factors influencing unification perceptions. The aim of this study is to analyze the 
change of South Koreans’ perception of unification using 8 years of empirical data and to 
identify and confirm various factors affecting perception of unification. This study reflected 
the existing framework of previous research comprehensively, and tried to make the most 
reasonable research framework by selecting and including the most important factors. 
Data 
I used the unification perceptions survey conducted by The Institute for Peace and 
Unification Studies Seoul National University from 2007 to 2014. This survey targeted men 
and women aged 19 to 65 from all 16 provinces. This survey collected data on 1,200 people 
each year, with a sample error of ±2.8% at the 95% confidence level. This survey used 
multi-stage stratified sampling and relied on a one to one individual interview method, using 
a structured questionnaire. This survey questionnaire contained about 150 questions 
concerning South Koreans’ attitudes on unification, on North Korea, on North Korean policy, 
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on North Korean defectors, and on their relationship with neighboring countries. I exclude 
from the analysis the questionnaires which had no response or contained ‘I do not know’ 
responses. 
Basic Framework of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables of this study are perceptions of the necessity of unification and 
the possibility of unification. First of all, I used the following question, “How much do you 
think unification is necessary for North and South Korea? Or do you think it is not necessary?” 
to measure perceptions of the necessity of unification. Available answers are: 1). not 
Expected benefit factors 
perception on (National benefit, 
Personal benefit) 
 
Private benefit 
Political factor 
(Ideology) 
National identity factors 
(perception on North Korea 
Friendship with North Koreans)  
 
Demographic factors 
(sex, education, income, age) 
Perceptions and 
attitude on 
Unification  
(Perception on 
necessity of 
unification, 
perception on 
Possibility of 
unification) 
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necessary at all; 2). a little bit unnecessary; 3). half and half; 4). a little bit necessary; 5). very 
necessary. Secondly, I use the following question, “When do you think unification is 
possible?” to measure perceptions of the possibility of unification. Answer options for this 
question were the following: 1). Impossible; 2). more than 30 years; 3). within 30 years; 4). 
within 20 years; 5). within 10 years; 6). within 5 years. After this survey, people’s responses 
to these two questions were coded to measure their relationship with independent variables. 
Independent variables 
   I divided independent variables into four options: They are expected benefit factors, the 
political factor, national identity factors, and demographic factors. Expected benefit factors 
are perceptions of economic consequences for unification to South Korea (perception of 
national benefit) and for the individual (perception of personal benefit). Political factor is 
South Koreans’ ideology. National identity factors are perceptions of North Korea and 
friendship with North Koreans. Demographic factors are sex, education, income, and age.  
   I used the following question, “How do you think reunification will give benefits to South 
Korea?” to measure perceptions on national benefits of unification. I used the following 
question “How do you think reunification will benefit you?” to measure perceptions of the 
private benefits of unification. Available answers are: 1). not at all profitable; 2). not very 
profitable; 3). a little bit profitable; 4). very profitable.  
From previous research, I can make the following hypothesis: the more people think that 
the profit from unification is going to be large, the greater the likelihood that the respondent 
views reunification as necessary and likely to happen. 
I used the following question “ Do you think you are politically progressive? Or do you 
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think you are conservative?” to measure the political factor. Available answers are: 1). very 
conservative; 2). a little bit conservative; 3). moderate; 4). a little bit progressive; 5). very 
progressive.  
From previous research, I can make the following hypothesis: Progressive people feel 
more strongly about the necessity of unification than the conservatives and are more 
optimistic about the possibility of unification. 
  I used two questions to measure national identity factors. First of all, I used the 
following question, “What do you think North Korea is for us?” to measure South Koreans’ 
perceptions of North Korea. Answers are as follows: 1). hostile target that threatens our safety; 
2). target we should watch out for; 3). competing target with South Korea; 4). cooperation-
needed target (we should cooperative with North Korea); 5). assistance- needed target (We 
should help North Korea). Finally I used the following question, “How friendly do you feel to 
North Korean defectors who are living in South Korea?” to measure friendship with North 
Koreans. Answers are as follows. 1). not at all friendly; 2). a little bit unfriendly; 3). a little 
bit friendly. 4). very friendly. 
   From previous research, I assume the following hypothesis: the more people who have 
a strong sense of national ties to North Korea or North Koreans, the more strongly they feel 
the need for unification and are optimistic about the possibility of unification. 
  I used sex, age, education, and income as control variables. From previous research, I 
assume the following hypotheses: younger generations feel weaker about the necessity of 
unification than older generations and will be pessimistic about the possibility of unification; 
males will respond more positively to the necessity of unification than females and will be 
more optimistic about the possibility of unification than females. 
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Table 1. Summary of Variables and Predicted effect on perceptions of unification 
Category Variable Scales 
Predicted effect 
on perception of 
Unification  
Dependent 
variables 
Perception on necessity 
of unification 
1. Not at all necessary 2.A little bit unnecessary. 3. Half 
and half. 4. A little bit necessary. 5. Very necessary.   
 
Perception on 
Possibility of 
unification 
1. Impossible. 2. More than 30 years. 3. within 30 
years . 4. within 20 years. 5. within 10 years  
6. within 5 years.  
 
Expected 
benefit factors 
Perception on national 
benefit 
1. Not at all profitable. 2. Not very profitable 3. A little 
bit profitable 4. Very profitable.  
positive 
Perception on personal 
benefit 
1. Not at all profitable. 2. Not very profitable. 3. A little 
bit profitable.  4. Very profitable.  
positive 
Political factor Ideology 
1. Very conservative. 2. A little bit conservative. 3. 
Moderate. 4. A little bit progressive. 5. Very 
progressive.  
positive 
National 
identity factors 
Perception on North 
Korea 
1. Hostile target. 2. Watching out target. 3. Competing 
target. 4. Cooperation-needed target 5. Assistance- 
needed target.  
positive 
Feeling of friendship 
with North Korean 
defectors 
1. Not at all friendly. 2. A little bit unfriendly. 3. A 
little bit friendly. 4. Very friendly. 
positive 
Demographic 
factors 
Age 1.20~29, 2.30~39, 3.40~49, 4.50~ positive 
Sex Male=1, female=2 negative 
Education 
1.under middle school,2.high school, 3.More than high 
school 
positive 
Income(Won) 
1. Under 2,000,000, 2,2,000,000-2,990,000, 
3.3,000,000-3,9990,000,4. More than 4,000,000 
negative 
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Data Description 
Ⅰ. Dependent variables 
1. Perception on necessity of unification. 
Figure 1. Perception on necessity of unification by all respondents 
 
First, the percentage of people who think that unification is necessary and very necessary 
account for more than 50% every year. This result shows that a lot of people still think that 
unification is necessary. However, the percentage of respondents who say that unification is 
unnecessary, very unnecessary, and half and half is also a significant proportion close to 40%.  
Figure 2. Perception on necessity of unification by age (2007-2014) 
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20%
30%
40%
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very necessary
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By age, younger generations have a stronger perception that unification is unnecessary 
than older generations. In the case of respondents in their 20s, only 46% perceived that 
unification is necessary or very necessary. On the other hand, 64% of respondents who are 50 
or older perceive that unification is necessary or very necessary. In the case of respondents in 
their 20s, 29% perceived that unification is unnecessary or very unnecessary. On the other 
hand, only 17% respondents who are 50 or older perceive that unification is unnecessary or 
very unnecessary. As a result, we can see that perception of unification has a big gap among 
generations. 
Figure 3. Perception on necessity of unification by sex (2007-2014) 
 
There are considerable gaps in the perception of necessity of unification between males 
and females. In the case of women, 19% of respondents answered that they think that 
4% 
15% 
19% 
29% 
34% 
5% 
19% 
26% 
29% 
21% 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
very
unnecessary
unnecessary half and half necessary very necessary
male
female
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unification is unnecessary, while only 15% of men answered that unification is unnecessary. 
For men, 34% of respondents think that unification is very necessary, while only 21% of 
women think that unification is very necessary. 
Figure 4. Perception on necessity of unification by ideology (2007-2014) 
 
According to ideological tendencies, progressive people have a stronger perception that 
unification is necessary than conservative people. In the case of highly progressive 
respondents, 52% perceived that unification is very necessary, significantly higher than 27% 
of highly conservative respondents. 
 
2. Perception and attitude on possibility of unification 
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Table 2. Perception on possibility of unification by all respondents 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
impossible 13% 22% 20% 21% 21% 19% 25% 24% 
more than 
30 years 
14% 25% 16% 21% 20% 20% 18% 20% 
Within 30 
years 
15% 15% 16% 13% 14% 18% 14% 18% 
Within 20 
years 
31% 22% 28% 24% 26% 26% 26% 22% 
Within 10 
years 
23% 13% 17% 18% 16% 14% 13% 14% 
Within5 
years 
4% 2% 3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 2% 
 
The response concerning the possible time for unification varies from the perception that 
reunification is possible within five years to the pessimistic perception that it is impossible. 
One of the important characteristics of the period of unification is that the table shows that 
the rate of respondents who believe that unification is impossible was consistently about 20% 
from 2008 to 2012. In addition to this, this ratio rose to 25% and 24% in 2013 and 2014, 
respectively. Evidently, there is a strong perception that unification is impossible or that 
unification is unlikely to happen within 30 years. 
Figure 5. Perception on possibility of unification by age (2007-2014) 
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The younger generation has a more pessimistic attitude on the possibility of unification 
than the older generation. Fourth nine (49) % of the 20’s respondents think that unification 
will take more than 30 years or is impossible. On the other hand, 36% of respondents over 50 
think that unification will take more than 30 years or is impossible.  
Figure 6. Perception on possibility of unification by sex (2007-2014) 
 
    Females have a more pessimistic attitude on the possibility of unification than males. In 
the case of females, the rate of respondents who believe that unification is impossible is 24%, 
which is significantly higher than that of men, which is 19%. On the other hand, 18% of 
males answered that unification is possible within 10 years, which is 4% higher than 14% of 
females. 
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Figure 7. Perception on possibility of unification by ideology (2007-2014) 
 
This figure shows that progressive respondents tend to be more optimistic about the 
possibility of unification than conservative respondents. In the case of very conservative 
respondents, the rate of ‘unification is not possible’ is 35%, which was significantly higher 
than the proportion of very progressive respondents, 18%. On the other hand, only 13% of 
very conservative respondents said that unification is possible within 10 years, while 23% of 
the very progressive respondents said the same. 
Table3 Correlation between two dependent variables 
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1   
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0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
18% 16% 22% 22% 
35% 
13% 17% 
21% 19% 
19% 
14% 17% 
16% 14% 
8% 25% 
28% 
25% 25% 
23% 
23% 
19% 14% 16% 13% 
7% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Within5 years
Within 10 years
Within 20 years
Within 30 years
more than 30 years
impossible
18 
 
 
Two dependent variables showed significant correlation. However, the correlation was 
less than 0.5. 
Ⅱ. Independent Variables 
1.Expected benefits factors 
Figure 8. Perception of expected benefits to South Korean society. 
 
 
About 50% of the respondents think that unification will give benefits to South Korean 
society; 50% of the respondents think that unification will not give benefits to South Korean 
society. 
Figure 9. Perception of expected benefits to individuals. 
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More than 70% of respondents think that unification will not benefit individuals. The rate 
at which unification benefits individuals is significantly lower than the rate at which 
unification benefits South Korean society. 
2. Political factor 
Figure 10. Distribution of ideology of respondents. 
 
In the case of ideology, the ratio of the respondents remains constant without any 
major change. The highest proportion of respondents is moderate (about 50%) followed by 
progressive and conservative.  
3. National identity factors 
Figure11. Perception of North Korea 
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The perception of North Korea as the target of cooperation is the strongest, and that ratio 
is gradually decreasing. The percentage recognizing North Korea as a cooperative target was 
highest at 57% in 2008, but it dropped to around 40% after 2010. The ratio of those who 
consider North Korea as a watching-out target rose from 12% in 2007 to 22% in 2014. The 
proportion of those who consider North Korea as a target of assistance has continued to 
decline. Comprehensively, the ratio of people seeing North Korea as a friendly nation is 
gradually declining while the ratio of people seeing North Korea as an opponent is gradually 
increasing. This may be due to North Korea's continuous nuclear development and persistent 
military threats.  
Figure 12. Feeling of friendship with North Korean defectors 
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 Although the proportion of people who believe that North Korea is a hostile target 
has increased, the friendship toward North Korean defectors has been gradually increasing. 
This phenomenon shows that the perception of North Korea and the perception of North 
Korean people can be dual and conflicting. 
4.Demographic factors 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics (Age, Sex, Education, Income (Manwon) 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
20-29 
25% 22% 25% 25% 22% 21% 21% 21% 
30-39 
26% 25% 26% 26% 24% 23% 23% 22% 
40-49 
25% 29% 26% 25% 26% 26% 26% 25% 
50- 
23% 24% 23% 23% 28% 30% 31% 32% 
Male 50% 50% 50% 50% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
Female 50% 50% 50% 50% 49% 49% 49% 49% 
Under middle 
school 
13% 12% 11% 9% 9% 9% 10% 8% 
high school 42% 47% 41% 39% 43% 46% 48% 43% 
more than high 
school 
45% 41% 48% 53% 48% 45% 42% 49% 
Income under 
200(Manwon) 
23% 20% 19% 17% 17% 13% 12% 9% 
200-299 31% 33% 29% 26% 24% 26% 22% 19% 
300-399 25% 28% 30% 28% 32% 31% 32% 33% 
more than 400 21% 19% 22% 29% 26% 30% 34% 39% 
Total(number) 
1,177 1,195 1,191 1,197 1,171 1,197 1,186 1,196 
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Analysis and Findings 
 The aim of this study is to analyze factors that affect South Koreans’ perceptions of 
unification. I use multiple regressions to determine the effect of independent variables on 
perceptions of unification. 
Tabel 5. Regression result of determinants on perception of necessity of unification 
 VARIABLES Perception and  
attitude on 
necessity of 
unification 
Standard errors 
Expected benefit 
factors 
Perception of 
national benefit 
0.412*** (0.0164) 
Perception of 
personal benefit 
0.232*** (0.0170) 
Political factor Ideology 0.0687*** (0.0130) 
National Identity 
factors 
Perception of North 
Korea 
0.119*** (0.00877) 
Friendship with 
North Korean 
defectors 
0.151*** (0.0163) 
Demographic 
factors 
Age 0.194*** (0.0110) 
Female -0.166*** (0.0212) 
Education 0.0686*** (0.0197) 
 Income -0.00368 (0.0106) 
 Year -0.0158*** (0.00462) 
 Observations 9,510  
 R-squared 0.276  
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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   Table 5 shows that expected benefit factors have substantial effects on attitudes about the 
necessity of unification. Perception of national benefit and perception of personal benefit 
have positive and significant effects on perception of the necessity of unification. Perception 
of the national benefit variable has a stronger effect (0.412) than perception of the personal 
benefit variable (0.232) 
   Age and sex also have a significant effect on perception of necessity of unification. Age 
has a positive relationship with perception of necessity of unification. This shows that older 
people perceive that the unification is necessary more strongly than younger generations. 
This phenomenon might be caused by the older generation’s experience. Sex has a negative 
relationship with perception of necessity of unification. Also, this shows that males perceive 
that the unification is necessary more strongly than females. Also, education has a positive 
effect on perception of necessity of unification. Finally, income has no significant effect on 
perception of necessity of unification. 
  National identity factors have a positive effect on perception of necessity of unification. 
‘The feeling of friendship with North Korea defectors’ variable has a slightly stronger effect 
(0.151) than perception of North Korea (0.119). This result shows that the more people 
identify with North Korea or North Koreans, the more strongly they perceive that unification 
is necessary.  
   Finally, ideology has a positive effect on perception of necessity of unification. This result 
shows that more progressive people perceive that unification is necessary than conservative 
people.  
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Tabel 6. Regression result of determinants on perception of possibility of unification 
 VARIABLES Perception of 
possibility of 
unification 
Standard errors 
Expected benefit 
factors 
Perception of 
national benefit 
0.331*** (0.0209) 
Perception of 
personal benefit 
0.230*** (0.0230) 
Political factor Ideology 0.0754*** (0.0174) 
National Identity 
factors 
Perception of North 
Korea 
0.146*** (0.0115) 
Friendship with 
North Korea 
defectors 
0.172*** (0.0221) 
Demographic 
factors 
Age 0.196*** (0.0149) 
Female -0.171*** (0.0285) 
Education 0.124*** (0.0272) 
 Income 0.00487 (0.0144) 
 Year -0.0454*** (0.00622) 
 Observations 9,510  
 R-squared 0.163  
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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   The result of regression on perception of possibility of unification shows that all 
independent variables except income have a statistically significant effect on the dependent 
variable. The expected benefits factors have the strongest effect on perception of possibility 
of unification and the political factor has the smallest effect. 
   ‘The perception of national benefit’ variable and perception of personal benefit have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on perception of possibility of unification. ‘The 
perception of national benefit’ variable has a stronger effect (0.331) than the perception of 
personal benefit variable (0.230). Also, expected benefits factors have a smaller effect on 
perception of possibility of unification than on perception of necessity of unification.  
   Age and education variables have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
perception of possibility of unification. Sex has a negative effect on perception of possibility 
of unification. This shows that males have a more positive attitude toward possibility of 
unification than females. Income has no significant effect on perception of possibility of 
unification. The effect of age on perception of possibility of unification is slightly stronger 
(0.196) than its effect on perception of necessity of unification (0.194). Also, in the case of 
sex and education, the effect on perception of possibility of unification is stronger than the 
effect on perception of necessity of unification.  
   This table shows that perception of North Korea and friendship with North Korean 
defectors has a positive and statistically significant effect on perception of possibility of 
unification. The effect of friendship with North Korean defectors has a slightly stronger effect 
(0.172) than perception of North Korea (0.146). The effect of these two national identity 
factors on perception of possibility of unification is stronger than their effect on perception of 
necessity of unification.   
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   Finally, ideology has a positive and statistically significant effect on perception of 
possibility of unification, but the size of the coefficient is relatively smaller (0.0754) than 
other independent variables.  
Limitations. 
   In order to analyze determinants of perceptions on unification, I used 9 independent 
variables. However, other factors that I did not consider can affect the perceptions of 
unification. 
   First of all, economic factors can affect the perceptions of unification. Economic factors 
such as unemployment rate, per capita income, and prices may have affected the perceptions 
toward unification. In general, it can be said that economic trends affect people's perceptions 
of unification. Therefore, good and bad economies can affect the perceptions of unification. 
Secondly, perception of international relationships can affect the perception of unification. 
Unification of Korea is an area of intertwined interests which involves not only the two 
Koreas but also various countries such as the United States, Japan, China and Russia. 
Therefore, I think that international relations among these countries and South Koreans’ 
perceptions of international relations can affect the perceptions of unification. 
Finally, government policy can affect the perceptions of unification. The new presidents of 
South Korea took office in 2008 and 2013, respectively, and the unification policy has 
changed significantly. The change of unification policy can affect South Koreans’ perceptions 
of unification. 
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Conclusion and recommendations 
The purpose of this study is to analyze how the perception of necessity of unification and 
the perception of possibility of unification have changed over time, and to find the factors 
that affect the perceptions of unification. Frist, both the raw percentages and the regression 
analysis indicate that support for unification has declined over time. Second, about 50% of 
the respondents responded that unification is necessary. What is noteworthy is that there are 
many differences in perception of the necessity of reunification based on age, sex, and 
ideology. Younger generations, females, and conservative people perceive that unification is 
unnecessary more strongly than older generations, males and progressive people. Regression 
analysis of the factors affecting the perception of necessity of unification shows that the 
expected benefits factors of unification have the largest effect. Next, demographic factors 
such as age and sex have the second largest effect. Thirdly, national identity factors have a 
considerable effect. Finally, the political factor has a statistically significant effect, but the 
strength is not high.  
The perception of the possibility of unification is very diverse. Younger generations, 
females, and conservative people are more pessimistic about the possibility of unification 
than older generations, males, and progressive people. Regression results for factors affecting 
the perception of possibility of unification shows that expected benefits factors have the 
largest effect; the same goes for the perception of necessity of unification. Demographic 
factors have the second largest effect and national identity factors also have a considerable 
effect. Demographic factors and national identity factors have a stronger effect on perception 
of possibility of unification than perception of necessity of unification. The political factor 
has a statistically significant effect, but its effect is weakest among all factors.  
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The results of this study show that a large number of people are pessimistic about the 
necessity and possibility of unification. Also, the perception of unification is different 
according to age, sex, ideology, and education. Unification policies that are not supported by 
the people in a democratic society are hard to implement. The South Korean government will 
be able to establish a unification policy supported by the people through an in-depth analysis 
of the factors affecting the perception of unification.  
The results of this study show that South Korean government should consider various 
factors to positively affect the people’s perceptions of unification. First, the government 
needs to research what the benefits of unification are and present them persuasively. Second, 
improving relations with North Korea and establishing intimate and friendly relations with 
North Korea can have a positive impact on the perceptions of unification. Finally, it is 
necessary to deeply study why unification perception varies according to sex, age, education, 
and ideology, and develop customized strategies to affect perceptions of unification for each 
factor. Also, I recommend that it is necessary to accumulate the panel data to measure the 
change of perceptions of unification accurately.  
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